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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(h). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in essentially ruling that, as a matter oflaw, a 
landlord that owns real property on which a tenant's cows are grazing is "in 
possession or control" of the livestock for purposes of Utah Code Annotated §4 l-
6a-407( 1 )(a)? 
Standard of Review: This is a legal issue that is reviewed by the appellate 
court de novo. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, In_c., 99 P.3d 801,813 (Utah 2004). 
"While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of law to the 
facts of the case. State v. Fuller, 2104 UT 29, iJl 7; 764 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. 
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: The appellant preserved this issue for 
appeal in its motion for summary judgment, R. 385-97, and in its motion for a 
directed verdict, R. 1142 at 161:9 to 164:17, and 167:25 to 169:9. 
2. Did the district court err in its legal ruling that, even though the 
evidence was insufficient to pierce the corporate veil, a relaxed standard applied 
and the defendant owed a greater duty? 
1 
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· Standard of Review: This is a legal issue that is reviewed by the appellate 
court de novo. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004). 
"While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal 
conclusions are reviewed. for correctness, including its application of law to the 
facts of the case. State v. Fuller, 2104 UT 29, ,Il 7; 764 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. 
· Preservation of Issue for Appeal: The appellant preserved this issue for 
appeal ~n its motion for summary j~dgment, R. R. 3 85-97, and in its motion for a 
directed verdict, R. 1142 at 161:9 to 164:17,'and 167:25 to 169:9. 
3. Was the jury's verdict in this case fatally inconsistent with itself? 
Standard of Review: This is a legal issue that is reviewed by the appellate 
court de novo. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801,813 (Utah 2004). 
"While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of law to the 
facts of the case. State v. Fuller, 2104 UT 29, ,r17; 764 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. 
Preservation of Issue for ·Appeal: The appellant raised the legal arguments 
upon which it now relies in its motion for summary judgment, 385-97, and in its 
motion for a directed verdict, R. 1142 at 161 :9 to 164:17, and 167:25 to 169:9. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-407(1)(a) provides: 
A person who owns or is in possession or control of any _livestock 
ma~ not willfully or n_egligently permit any of the livestock to stray or 
2 
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remain unaccompanied on a highway if both sides of the highway are 
separated from adjoining property by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, 
curb, lawn, or building. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and Disposition in the 
Trial Court 
This case involves a claim made by the plaintiff, Patrick Liley ("Liley"), 
against Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. ("Cedar Springs"), and other parties. Liley 
alleges that he sustained injuries when he struck a cow that had entered Utah's 
Highway 28 in Juab County. Cedar Springs moved for summary judgment and 
established that it did not own the cow that was hit by Liley ( or any cows for that 
matter). Cedar Springs also argued that, as a matter of law, Cedar Springs did not 
have a duty to maintain fences along Highway 28. 
On the first day of the trial, the district court denied Cedar Springs' motion 
for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. See District Court Docket, 
Minute Entry dated 3-3-15 and entitled "Minutes for Jury Trial."1 Cedar Springs 
then ·renewed its legal arguments in a motion for directed verdict, which the district 
court also denied. R. 1142 at 161:9 to 164:17, 167:25 to 169:9, and 169:10 to 
170: 12. Although the district court recognized that Cedar Springs did not own the 
cow and was not in possession of property near the hig~way, the district court 
1 The docket sheet is included as part of the record, but it is not paginated. 
3 
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ruled that there was a "close.interrelationship" between Cedar Springs and its 
tenant. R. 1142 at 170:1-2. While the district court ruled that it was not piercing 
the corporate veil, it nevertheless held that a greater duty existed because of the 
relationship between the companies. Id. 
The jury returned a verdict against Cedar Springs, and the district court 
entered judgment against Cedar Springs on March 20, 2015. R. 801-803. Cedar 
Springs filed a timely notice of appeal on April 2, 2015. R. 846-47. 
Statement of Facts 
1. At 2:00 a.m. on October 4, 2009, Patrick Liley was travelling north on 
Highway 28 in Juab County when he hit and killed a cow. R. 1142 at 82:24 to 
83:3; R. 864 at 118:16-22. 
2. It is undisputed that Cedar Springs did not own the cow that Liley hit 
and killed. Indeed, it is undisputed that Cedar Springs has never owned any cows. 
R. 390. 
3. Cedar Springs owned land on the east side of the highway near where 
the accident occurred. Id. 
4. Cedar Springs leased the property to an entity called Warm Creek 
Ranch, Inc. ("Warm Creek"). Id. 
5. Under the lease _agreement between Cedar Springs and Warm Creek, 
Warm Creek was responsible to maintain the fences on the property. Id. 
. 4 
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6. The jury found that Wann Creek (the tenant) was _not at fault, R. 788, 
and that the percentage of the fault that caused Liley' s harm was 0% attributable to 
Warm Creek, R. 789. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in not granting Cedar Springs' motion for summary 
judgment and in then allowing the jury to decide issues of law. As a matter of law, 
Cedar Springs did not owe a duty to Liley in this case, and Liley sued the wrong 
2 party~ 
ARGUMENT 
In his First Amended Complaint, Liley alleged just one cause of action 
against Cedar Springs. That claim was for negligence. In order to establish 
negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed it a duty. In this case, as 
a matter of law, there are only three possible legal bases upon which Cedar Springs 
could have owed a duty to Liley. 
The first possible basis for a duty is Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-407 ( 1 )(a), 
which applies to "[a] person who owns or is in possession or control of any 
livestock." As shown below, Cedar Springs did not own the cow that Liley hit and 
killed. Indeed, Cedar Springs has never owned or controlled any livestock. 
2 For some reason, Liley did not sue Warm Creek, and although the jury was asked 
to apportion fault, Warm Creek was never a defendant in the case. 
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A second possible basis for a .legal duty is Cedar Spring' s status as a 
landlord (the theory being that a landlord is in "control" of its tenant's livestock). 
However, as shown below, the Utah Supreme Court has held that it is the duty of a 
tenant, not a landlord, to keep premises safe. 
Finally, although not relied upon by Liley, it is conceivable that the doctrine 
of respondeat superior cou~d provide some sort of a basis for a duty on the part of 
. Cedar Springs. However, the jury found that the tenant was 0% at fault here, and, 
as matter of law, if a tenant is not negligent,. its landlord can have no liability under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Stated differently, while it is conceivable that 
Cedar Springs could have been negligent in super.vising Warm Creek, the jury 
found that Warm Creek was 0% at fault for the accident. Therefore, there is 
nothing for the landlord to answer for. Accordingly, the jury's verdict is internally 
inconsistent, and it cannot be sustained. 
I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, SECTION 41-6a-407(1)(a) DID NOT 
IMPOSE A DUTY ON CEDAR SPRINGS AS LANDLORD. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-407{l)(a) provides: 
A person who owns or is in possession or control of any livestock 
may not willfully or negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or 
remain unaccompanied on a highway if both sides of the highway are 
separated from adjoining property by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, 
curb, lawn, or building. 
As a matter of law, Cedar Springs did not own, possess, or control any livestock. 
The district court therefore erred in denying Cedar Springs' motion for summary 
6 
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judgment, as well as its motion for a directed verdict. The district court then 
compounded this error by allowing the jury to decide the meaning of the statute. 
It was undisputed on summary judgment, that Cedar Springs did not own the 
cow that Liley hit. Indeed, it is undisputed that Cedar Springs has never owned 
any livestock. N~ne of these facts were disputed at trial. 
Further, as pointed out in Cedar Springs' motion for summary judgment; the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that a landlord "is not deemed to be the principal of 
his tenant merely because of the landlord-tenant relationship." Stephenson v. 
Warner, 581 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, the court held that a 
landlord is "not responsible for the tenant's torts, nor for the tenant's failure to 
keep the premises reasonably safe and in good repair." Id. The supreme court 
stated: "On the contrary, ... it is the tenant who is responsible for any dangerous 
condition on the premises which he creates or permits to come into existence- after 
he has taken possession." Id. at 586-69. Thus, as a matter of law, Cedar Springs is 
not liable to Liley for its tenant's failure (if any) to "keep the premises ... in good 
repair." This would apply to the fences on the property. The district court 
therefore erred in denying the motion for summary judgment. 
The district court's error was then compounded when the court allowed the 
jury to decide issues of law regarding what constitutes "control" under section 41-
6a-407 (1 )(a). Liley's counsel was permitted to tell the jury, "the rule is if you're in 
7 
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control of livestock means it's in your property." R. 864 at 94:8-9 (emphasis 
added). Contrary to the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Stephenson, Liley's 
counsel was allowed to further tell the jury that "[t]he owner-of the property _is 
responsible to make sure that they take reasonable care ih maintaining_ their 
fences." R. 864 at 94:25 to 95:2. 
Defense counsel objected to the foregoing statements to the jury, stating: 
"Object, Your Honor. He's arguing the law, and it's a complete misstatement of 
the law, Your Honor." R. 864 at 97:4-6. The Court overruled the objection. R. 
864 at. 97 :7-10. The effect of this ruling was to allow the jury-and not the 
court-to interpret the statute based upon the arguments of counsel. This was 
error. 
After the court overruled defense counsel's objection, Liley's counsel 
continued to tell the jury how th:~ statute must be interpreted. For example, Liley's 
counsel told the jury that the law imposes a non-delegable duty on a landlord. R. 
864 at 97:13-20. He also told the jury in his closing argument: "[T]he safety law 
in the state says it's their responsibility. It wasn't Warm Creek's [the tenant]." R. 
- 1453 at 42: 18-20. Counsei further instructed the jury as follows: "What 
percentage belongs to Warm Creek? Zero. Why. I told you what the safety law 
says." R. 1453 at 45:17-19. In other words, Liley did not argue that Cedar Springs 
was liable based upon some factual issues regarding Cedar Springs' failure to 
8. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
supervise its tenant. Rather, Liley' s argument was a legal one. Liley' s counsel 
was very plain: "Our claims are against Cedar Springs because it was their 
property, and the cows were on their property, and the safety law in the state says 
it's the~r responsibility." R. 1453 at 42:16-20. This argument demonstrates that 
this case was decided based upon a legal issue. And legal issues should have been 
decided by the court. Under the supreme court's ruling in Stephenson, the district 
court erred in allowing the jury to decide that-as a matter of law-a landlord 
"controls" livestock owned by its tenant. Furthermore, this court reviews legal 
issues de novo, so the jury's determination on this particular point is not entitled to 
any deference. 
Furthermore, the problem in this case was compounded in a significant and 
prejudic~al way when Liley's counsel informed the jury that "[i]fyou award any 
percentage of fault to Warm Creek, Patrick Liley can't be compensated for that." 
R. 1453 at 42:2-4. It is unclear why Liley chose not to sue Warm Creek, but it was 
his decision, not Cedar Springs'. More importantly, counsel's comment _likely led 
the jury to believe that underthe so-called "safety statute," Cedar Springs was 
liable and that apportioning fault to Warm Creek would deprive Liley of a 
recovery. 
Of course, as stated above, Liley could have presented factual evidence 
regarding the relationship between Cedar Springs and its tenant. But there was no 
9 
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such evidence presented. Instead Liley relied on legal arguments, telling (actually, 
instructing) the jury what the Word "possession" in.the statute means: Counsel 
stated: "Possession is the cows are on their property." R. 145~ at 35:23-24 
( emphasis added). Counsel continued, "Well, it's your responsibility, Cedar 
Springs, it's your.property, and you have cows on the property. That's what the 
law says." R. 1453 at 36:16-19. 
Based upon the foregoing, the jury was left with the impression that section 
41-6a-407 ( 1 )(a) is a strict liability statute for landlords and that ownership of real 
property is enough to impose per se liability under section 41-6a-407{l)(a). 
However, this is not what the statute says. If the legislature had wanted to base the 
duty under section 41-6a-407(1)(a) on ownership of real property, it could have 
easily done so. But it did not. Rather, the legislature based the duty on 
"possession or control of ... livestock." The district court erred in not interpreting 
the law itself, in not ruling that based on the undisputed facts Cedar Springs was 
not in possession or control of any livestock, and then in allowing the jury to 
decide what the statute means. 
The district court based its approach on the notion that Cedar Springs and 
Warm Creek are related corporations. This too was error.· The district court 
aclmowledged. that there was not sufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil, 
but the court decided to bend the rules because of the close relationship between 
10 
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Cedar Springs an~ Warm Creek. However, the district court should have simply 
decided what section 41-6a-407 ( 1 )(a) means. The statute cannot mean one thing in 
one context and another thing in situations in which corporations are related. The 
statute should be interpreted and ~pplied uniformly. That is the essence of due 
process. If Warm Creek and Cedar Springs were not entitled to be treated as 
separate legal entities, then the court should have so held. But if they are separate 
entities they are entitled to be treated as such under Stephenson and under section 
41-6a-407{l)(a). 
II. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT CEDAR SPRINGS 
OWED OR ASSUMED ANY DUTY OTHER THAN IN ITS 
CAP A CITY AS LANDLORD. 
A second possible basis for finding that Cedar Springs ~we~ a l_egal duty to 
Liley might be based on evidence at trial that Cedar Springs assumed some sort of 
duty to maintain the fences. However, it is undisputed that under the lease 
agreement between Cedar Springs and Warm Creek, it was Warm Creek's duty to 
maintain the fences. There was no factual evidence regarding any other duty or 
any failure to supervise. 
.. •.•:,.:_,;,.·. 
III. AS A MATTER OF LAW, CEDAR SPRINGS COULD NOT HA VE 
BEEN HELD LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT 
SUPERIOR BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT WARM CREEK 
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
Finally, it might be possible to argue that Cedar Springs was required to 
answer for the negligence of its tenant under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
11 
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However, such an argument would be inappropriate here because Warm Creek (the 
owner of the livestock) was not negligent. As stated above, the jury specifically 
found that Warm Creek was 0% responsible for Liley' s injuries in this case. If 
Warm Creek was not liable for failing to maintain fences, then, as a matter of law, 
there is• no negligence for the superior party to answer for. If, for example, a jury 
finds that a pizza delivery person is not responsible for causing an automobile 
accident, then there is no basis in the law for holding the owner of the pizza 
company liable for any damages. Thus, the jury's verdict in this case is internally 
inconsistent, and it cannot be sustained. It cannot be said that the tenant was 0% 
responsible but that the landlord should nevertheless answer for the tenant's 
alleged failure to maintain the fences. If Warm Creek was not a fault in any way, 
then there was no actionable failure to maintain fences. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the fore going reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of 
the district court. 
DATED this· 3rd day of March, 2016. 
12 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Disclosures 
vjj 02-12-15 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service: Certificate of Service 
of Subpoena 
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-12-15 Judge JENNIFER A BROWN assigned. 
02-17-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon JEAN DAVID VIGOS for 
Party Served: PATRICK LILEY 
'vJ Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: February 12, 2015 
02-17-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-18-15 Filed: Subpoena to Dale Darius (with Sheriffs Proof of Service) 
02-18-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-19-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Plaintiffs Motion In Limine to 
Preclude David Vigos from Testifying About Plaintiffs Mental 
Alertness 
02-19-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
(:JJ 02-23-15 Filed: Defendant State of Utahs Proposed Vair Dire of the Jury 
Venire 
02-23-15 Filed: Exhibit A- Proposed Voir Dire Examination of the Venire 
02-23-15 Filed: Exhibit B- Courts Modified Jury Vair Dire Examination of 
the Venire 
02-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
02-24-15 Filed: PLAINTIFF PATRICK LILEYS PROPOSED VOIR DIRE OF THE JURY 
VENIRE 
02-24-15 Filed: Exhibit 1 
02-24-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
03-03-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial 
Judge: JENNIFER A BROWN 
Clerk: raelenec 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): PATRICK LILEY 
Defendant(s): DALE DORIUS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE 
JENNIFER D REYES 
TANNER A STRICKLAND LENART 
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CASE NUMBER 120600012 ~er~onal Injury 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:21 
This matter comes before the Court for day one of jury trial. 
Court and counsel meet in chambers off the record regarding the 
pending motions. Court makes findings and denies the motion for 
summary judgment, denies the motion to preclude testimony of David 
Vigos, as to the State's Objections to Plaintiff's pre-tr~al 
disclosures the highway patrol report is reserved, affidavit of 
Tony Dick is excluded, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with 
foundation, photographs of cattle are excluded, Juab County Sheriff 
records are excluded, and as to the State's Objections to Cedar 
Springs' Ranch pre-trial disclosures the highway patrol report is 
reserved, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with foundation 
and deposition transcripts are excluded. 
TIME: 9:21 AM Jurors are welcomed and thanked for their patience 
and appearance. 
TIME: 9:25 AM Potential jurors are sworn in. Voir dire begins. 
TIME: 9:43 AM Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 9:57 AM Voir dire continues in chambers. 
TIME: 11:47 AM Court resumes in the court room. Jurors selected to 
serve on the case: 1-2, 2-3, 3-12, 4-13, 5-14, 6-17, 7-18, 8-23 and 
9-24. 
TIME: 11:50 AM Remaining jurors are thanked and excused. 
TIME: 11:50 AM Jurors are seated and given the oath for trial 
jurors. 
TIME: 11:52 AM Preliminary Instructions are read to the jury by the 
Court. 
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1 becomes theirs; it's_ their right to take control 
2 of that and it's their duty to mai~tain and it-
3 whatnot. That just simply isn't the case. That's 
4 not what happens in those situations. 
5 And so we still believe that they've 
6 failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that 
7 there was a duty· on behalf of Cedar Springs Ranch 
8 to the plaintiff, and we would ask the Court to 
9 move for a directed verdict. Thanks. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. In making this 
11 ruling, I want to make clear that in no way is my 
12 ruling intended to address anj breach of piercing 
13 the corporate veil. I understand the difference 
14 of the different corporations that are at issue 
15 here, although I'm hesitant to even try to say the 
16 names because I'm sure I would get warm and cedar 
17 and springs and creek mixed up. I certainly do 
18 understand the distinction between those~ 
19 However, ·the difference here is that 
20 while they are distinct legal entities, Mr. Darius 
21 is a principal in both. There is a 
22 landlord/tenant relationship based upon his own 
23 testimony, and I do find that a landlord does have 
24 some duty to control the actions of its tenant, 
25 and I would say that at least in this case I would 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 169 
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1 think that duty perhaps is slightly greater given 
2 the close interrelationship of the parties. 
3 And so unlike the directed verdict for 
4 UDOT, I am going to find that there is sufficient 
5 competent evidence to go to the jury on the issue 
6 of negligence with regard to Cedar Springs Ranch. 
7 And I note in makirtg this decision that· there's 
8 already been an indication of an intent to. 
9 allocate fault to Warm Springs which Cedar Springs 
10 still has available to it in this action. And so 
11 I'm going to deny the motion for the directed 
12 verdict, and we'll move forward on that basis. 
13 MR. MILLARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 Your Honor, may we deal with one wel-1, I guess 
15 you could let UDOT go, but could we deal with one 
16 issue that I just noted in the jury instructions, 
17 and it's with respect to Jury_Instruction No. 11. 
18 Instead of stating the defendant Cedar Springs 
19 Ranch it has Warm Creek. Warm Creek is not a 
20 defendant. Plaintiffs made that same allegation, 
21 and that is the law of the case is that Utah Code 
22 41-6-407 applies to this action, and that needs to 
2 3 be corrected. 
24 THE COURT: I will take a look at that. 
25 Would you like to be heard on that, Counsel, with 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 170 
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VERDICT FORM 
Members of the jury: 
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. 
E--
If you find that the i~sue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence answer 
''Yes," if not, answer ''No." 
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to all of the required questions, but they need 
not be the same six on each question. When six or more of you have agreed on the answer to 
each question that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and 
advise the bailiff that you have reached a verdict 
Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. 
Question (1) - Was Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. at fault? (If you answer "Yes," answer Question 
(2). If you answer "no," stop here, have the foreperson sign the verdict form, and advise the 
bailiff. lit Yes D No 
Question (2) - Was Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. 's fault a cause of Patrick Liley's harm? (If you 
answer "Yes," answer Question (3). If you answer "no," stop here, have he foreperson sign the 
verdict form, and advise the bailiff.) jBIYes D No 
Warm Creek Ranch, Inc. 
Question (3) - Was Warm Creek Ranch, Inc. at fault? (If you answer "Yes," answer Question 
(4). If you answer "No," go to the next set ofinstructions.) • Yes ~ No 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C .. 
Question (4)- Was Warm Creek Ranch, Inc.'s ~aultacauseof Patric~ Liley's harm? 
(Regardless of your answer, go to the riext'set of instructions). D Yes· D No 
Patrick Liley 
Question (5) ..:.·was Patrick Liley at fault? (If you answer "Yes,"' B.llSWer Question (6). If you 
answer ''No," answer Questions 7 and 8) ,81Yes • No· 
Question (6) - Was Patrick Liley's fault a cause of his own harm? (If you answer "Yes," answer 
Questions 7, 8 and 9.) Jli:TYes • No 
Comparative Fault 
Question (7) - What percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley' s harm is attributable to Cedar 
Springs Ranch? (If your answer to either (1) or (2) is ''No," then enter zero.) _$ ........... ,S: __ %. 
Qu~tion (8)- What percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley's harm is attributable to Warm 
. . .. . . . . . 
Creek Ranch? (If your ~werto (3) or (4) is ''No," then enter zero.); tJ % 
---=----
Question (9) - What per~nt of the fault that caused Patrick Liley' s fuum is attributable to 
.. . . ... . 
Patrick Liley? (If y~ur answer to (5) or (6) is ''No," then enter zero.) : _,_s: ___ % 
The total must equal 100% 100% 
. . 
If Patrick Liley' s fault is 50% or more, stop here~ have the foreperson· sign the verdict form and 
advise the bailiff. If Patrick Liley's fault is less than 50%, answer Question (10). Do not deduct 
from the damages any percentage of fault that you have assessed to Patrick Liley. The judge will 
make any necessary deductions later. 
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Question (10) - What amount fairly compensates Patrick Liley for: 
• Past Medical Expenses 
• Other Economic Damages 
• Non-Economic Damages 
Total 
$ CJ 
$ ~o :z,9, 't.t/ 0 -
When ·six or more of you agreed on the answer to each question that is reqwred to be answered, 
your foreperson should sign and date the form and advise the bailiff that you have reached a 
verdict. 
Date 
Sign here • ~£"j4), 
Jury Foreperson 
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